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 1.  Introduction  
 
Recent scandals on Wall Street suggest that exploitation of uninformed investors could be quite 
pervasive in the market place.2  Numerous media coverage and empirical studies have shown 
that firms, brokers, and analysts have manipulated financial information in order to profit from 
unwary investors.3 The revelations have dealt a serious blow to investor trust in the US, much 
like crony capitalism shattered investor confidence in Southeast Asia in 1997. Recent fiasco on 
Wall Street and the financial crisis in Asia has demonstrated that corporate governance is of 
primary importance for investment returns.   
One of the main difficulties in studying corporate governance is lack of quality 
information. This is especially the case in emerging markets, where there are fewer disclosure 
rules, and much less enforcement of insider trading laws. Moreover, disclosed information, 
including analyst reports, is often subject to manipulation. Corporate governance problems are 
even more pervasive in emerging markets due to poor protection of the minority shareholder 
rights, unequal treatment of foreign and domestic stockholders, and underdeveloped legal and 
regulatory environment. To protect themselves against corporate predators, investors in 
emerging markets need to find alternative source of information on corporate governance.   
 This paper contributes to the literature by establishing a relationship between returns 
autocorrelation and corporate governance. Our paper is based on a dynamic volume-return 
model of Llorente, Michaely, Saar, and Wang (2001, LMSW hereafter). The essence of the 
model is that intensive trading volume together with stock return autocorrelation can help us 
identify firms with high degree of private information trading. In periods of high volume, 
stocks with a high degree of speculative trading tend to exhibit positive return autocorrelation 
and stocks with a low degree of speculative trading tend to exhibit negative return 
                                                 
2 Recent the New York State attorney general has made numerous investigations into leading Wall Street firms 
for issuing inflated investment ratings and offering “hot” IPOs in turn for investment banking business from 
telecom companies. Several CEOs from once high-flying companies have been indicted or have pleaded guilty 
to outright stealing from shareholders.   
3Hayes (1998), Lim (2001), and Michaely and Womack (1999) have shown that information is manipulated in 
order to drum up investment banking business, to maintain access to information, or to stimulate trading by 
investors. (For example, numerous telecom analysts were alleged or found to have inflated earnings forecasts for 
companies such as Global Crossing, Quest, WorldCom and Winstar. Despite mounting loss and falling revenues, 
many continued their buy recommendation for investors until their bankruptcy.) 
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 autocorrelation. Using US data, LMSW show that the differences in the dynamics of returns 
and volume across stocks are closely associated with different degrees of information 
asymmetry. This paper extends their work to measure the degree of information asymmetry in 
emerging market stocks. We will implicitly control for market microstructure effects such as 
bid-ask spread, poor liquidity, and nonsynchronous trading. 
Another goal of this study is to establish a link between a measure of private 
information trading and various indicators of corporate governance quality. Intuitively, 
informational asymmetry is related to the quality of corporate governance and information 
disclosure. Therefore, intensity of private information trading is a useful indicator for 
identifying corporate governance problems on both macro- and micro-level in the economy. 
We examine how the regulatory environment in the emerging markets’ countries affects 
informational trading. We also study the relation between intensity of private information 
trading and company-specific indicators of investor rights protection.  We find that stocks in 
countries that enforce insider-trading law, have higher standards of information disclosure, and 
provide better investor protection exhibit less private information trading. One of the main 
advantages of our study is that it relies on trading data rather than accounting data, whose 
standards could vary greatly across-different markets.    
Our study builds on a growing literature on return autocorrelation and turnover. Harvey 
(1995a) was first to examine the determinants of return autocorrelation in emerging market 
indices. He documented that a lack of diversification and trading depth induces spurious serial 
correlation in some countries but noted that more needs to done to explain the return 
autocorrelation. Rouwenhorst (1999) found that return factors and turnover are related in 
emerging markets. However, the focus of his study is on liquidity issues. Our paper extends a 
large body of literature on emerging market asset pricing by studying high frequency daily data 
at the firm level. Most previous studies, such as Bailey and Lim (1992), Bekaert and Harvey 
(1995, 1997, 2000), Bekaert, Harvey, and Ng (2002), Harvey (1995a, 1995b), and Henry 
(1999, 2000), use the low frequency monthly data. 
Our paper is related to several recent studies that have investigated the impact of 
information asymmetry on foreign equity holdings. Brennan and Cao (1997) demonstrated that 
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 a disadvantage in information might help explain foreign investors’ home bias.4  Bhattacharya, 
Daouk, Jorgenson, and Kehr (2000) also showed that the presence of unrestricted insider 
trading has caused prices to fully incorporate firm information before its public release in 
Mexico. Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002) further discovered that lack of prosecution of inside 
trading create a hazardous investment environment for foreign investors in emerging markets. 5 
This tends to scare away foreign investment and thus drive up cost of capital. They call for the 
development of methodology for ranking emerging stock markets in terms of their "market 
integrity," so that foreign investors could be warned against treacherous markets where insider 
trading is rampant. 
The rest of the paper is organized into the following sections. Section 2 describes the 
methodology for measuring private information trading after controlling for microstructure 
effects. Section 3 presents the empirical results. Section 4 discusses private information trading 
around corporate events and corporate governance issues in Russia. Section 5 concludes.  
 
2.  Methodology 
 
In this section, we begin by briefly introducing the LMSW model, in which investors trade for 
both hedging and information reasons. We use the model to demonstrate how the dynamic 
relation between return and volume depends on the information asymmetry between investors. 
Since our goal here is just to establish the intuition behind our study, we will simply describe 
                                                 
4  Albuquerque, Bauer and Schneider (2001) also develop a framework for characterizing asymmetric 
information in international equity markets.  In addition, Bhattacharya, Daouk, and Welker (2001) point out that 
the practice of earnings management makes it harder for foreign investors to obtain relevant information about 
emerging market firms. They show that earnings management in a country is linked to a decrease in trading in 
the stock market of that country and is weakly linked to an increase in U.S. home bias towards that country. 
5 It is worth noting that our study does not provide a direct measure of insider trading. Rather it measures the 
degree of speculative trading based on private information. Conceptually, private information may come from 
two main sources, inside information and information derived from research by security analysts. As Bainbridge 
(2000) notes, insider trading is hard to measure empirically by the subject’s illegality. The only source of data 
concerning legal trades is the trading reports filed by corporate insiders in the US but such stringent reporting 
seldom exists in emerging markets. While our study has shown a significant presence of private information 
trading in emerging markets, it does not necessarily mean the strong presence of insider trading. However, they 
do indicate a great deal of information asymmetry staked up against uninformed local and foreign investors. 
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 the economy and provide the theoretical results. Interested readers are referred to the original 
paper of LMSW.  
 The economy is defined on a discrete time sequence and there are two traded securities, 
a riskless bond and a stock. The bond is in unlimited supply at a constant non-negative interest  
rate. The stock’s dividend D  at the end of the time period is the sum of two components  
and : . There are two classes of investors.  Investors are identical within each 
class, but are different in their endowments and information. Both groups observe F , but 
group 1 has an information advantage of also observing G . The degree of informational 
asymmetry is measured using a standard deviation of second signal . In addition, investors 
are also endowed with a non-traded asset with payoff N , and the random endowment 
 Investors maximize their expected utility over the next period wealth using a 
common exponential utility function conditional on their respective information set. All shocks 
to the economy are normally distributed with zero mean and constant variances. In addition, 
they are assumed to be mutually independent, except for the payoff to non-traded asset and 
dividend on the stock, which are correlated. 
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 LMSW point out that the above model provides two important motives for trading: 
hedging risk and speculation on future returns by informed investors. Each investor holds stock 
and non-traded asset in his portfolio. Since the returns on the two assets are correlated, as his 
holding of the nontraded asset changes, each investor wants to adjust his stock positions to 
maintain an optimal risk exposure. This generates hedging trade in the model. On the other 
hand, some investors might have private information about future stock returns. As new private 
information arrives, they take speculative positions in the stock, which generates informational 
trade in the model.  
 LMSW solve for the equilibrium stock price and trading volume by providing the 
following dynamic volume-return relationship: 
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 Here, C  represents the unconditional return autocorrelation provided the correlation between 
volume and return is small. C  indicates whether stocks are dominated by hedging trades or 
trades generated by private information. Thus, a statistically positive C coefficient suggests 
significant informational trades, whereas a statistically negative C  coefficient indicates 
dominating hedging trades. In principle, all stocks have both informational and hedging trades.  
When either of them dominates, C becomes statistically insignificant. LMSW note that 
“…When all trades are hedging trades, current returns together with high volume predict 
strong reversals in future returns.”
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
6  This implies a negative C  coefficient. Another way of 
understanding a negative C  is that it captures the liquidity effect, which measures the price 
impact of a given size trade.  Thus, the more illiquid the stock, the larger will be the price 
impact, and the more negative the C  coefficient will be. Pastor and Stambaugh (2002) have 
used this result to measure stock and constructed a market liquidity measure based on 
aggregating C  coefficients across stocks.  
2
2
However, if speculative trades are more important, the stock’s future expected payoff 
changes.7   Because LMSW adopt non-fully revealing signaling equilibrium model all the 
information about future expected payoff is not incorporated in the today’s stock price. 
Therefore it takes one or several more trading periods in order for information to be 
incorporated fully in the stock price. LMSW have shown that, ceteris paribus, C  increases 
with the degree of information asymmetry.
2
 8   
One apparent advantage of the LMSW model is that it can be easily extended to 
implicitly control for returns autocorrelation resulted from microstructure effects such as bid-
ask bounce and non-synchronous trading (or stale prices). According to Roll (1984), the bid-
ask bounce would introduce a negative serial correlation for stock returns, which can be 
captured by a negative C  coefficient. On the other hand, if non-synchronous trading (or stale 
prices) dominates, then we would expect a positive serial correlation for stock returns, which 
1
                                                 
6 See also Campbell, Grossman and Wang (1993).  
7 Here we will use private information trades and speculative trades interchangeably. 
8 To be more precise, C  increases with the degree of information asymmetry . 2
2
Gσ
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 can be captured by a positive C  coefficient. C  could also be positive (or negative) if there is 
short-term price momentum (or reversal).   
1
,
1
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In this paper, we will estimate the above equation and measure the intensity of 
asymmetric information in emerging market stocks. Following LMSW, we make several 
modifications of the theoretical model for empirical analysis. The theoretical model uses dollar 
returns per share and normalized volume, while we use log returns (because stock prices in 
emerging markets are not stationary) and detrended log turnover as in LMSW. We begin by 
estimating the following regression derived from equation (1): 
 
.1,,2,101, ++ +++= titititi VCRCCR ε         (2) 
 
We use daily continuously compounded return and trading volume for the estimation of (2). 
Following earlier studies, such as LMSW and Stickel and Verrecchia (1994), we define 
continuously compounded return as ))log(( 1,, −+= tiitti PDPR , and volume as 
∑
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jjtitititi VOLNVOLV  where  is the daily close price, VOL  
is the daily number of shares traded, and N  the total number of outstanding shares in day t 
for company i. We use detrended daily turnover as a measure of trading volume for individual 
stocks. Lo and Wang (2000) provide theoretical justification for using daily turnover as a proxy 
for the trading volume of individual stocks. We found that daily time series of turnover are 
nonstationary, so we measure turnover in logs and detrend the series. Following LMSW, we 
change zero trading volume to a small constant 0.00000255 before taking logs and detrend 
resulting series by subtracting 20-day moving average
tiP , ti,
9. Here we assume the error term in 
equation (2) is uncorrelated over time, but its variance may vary.10 
We also examine the dynamic volume-return relationship by using excess returns and 
excess turnover. Our objective is to remove the market effect and concentrate on the 
idiosyncratic component of individual stock return and volume. It is conceivable that the 
                                                 
9  We also detrend series by 60-day and 120-day moving average. The number of stocks robust to MA 
specification in each country is reported in the last column of Table 2.  
 
8 
 market component in returns and turnover is associated with “allocational trades” while 
company-specific (idiosyncratic) component is associated with private informational trade. 
This may make it easier to discover the presence of informational trades. Thus, we will run the 
following regression: 
 
,1,,,2,101, ++ +++= tietietietieti VRCRCCR ε       (3) 
 
where are return and turnover in excess of the market.,,,, tmti
e
ti RRR −= tmtieti VVV ,,, −= 11  
 
3.  Empirical Results on Speculative Trading and Corporate Governance 
 
3.1 Data  
We collect trading data for other emerging markets from Datastream.12 Information on the 
exchange rates has been retrieved from the S&P DRI Pro database. We have considered a large 
sample of emerging markets’ stocks in our study. Countries included into our study are: 
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Columbia, Greece, India, Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, 
Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Russia, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Turkey, and Venezuela. For 
each country we take their respective market index constituents whenever they are available in 
Datastream and include them in our sample. For Argentina we have used the Merval Index 
Constituents, for Brazil – the Bovespa index, for Chile -- IPSA selective index, etc. We then 
cross check the obtained sample with the constituent list of the IFC/ S&P investible index for 
the above emerging markets. Overall we have a total of 1005 emerging markets stocks. Market 
capitalization for each country and some basic statistics are reported in Table 1. The sample 
period is from January 1, 1995 to November 1, 2001. This results in a total of 1785 daily 
                                                                                                                                                        
10 See Harvey (1995b), and Bekaert and Harvey (1995, 2000) for time-varying volatility in emerging markets.  
11 We have also tried to define excess return and excess turnover by using the CAPM model and the market 
model respectively. The empirical results are not qualitatively affected.  
12 The only exception here is Russia, where the data is obtained from Russian Trading System website. Gasprom 
trading data comes from AKM Russian consulting agency. Russian sample starts at September 1st, 1995, ends 
November 1st, 2001.    
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 observations on three variables: close price, number of shares traded, and the total number of 
shares outstanding for the selected stocks. 13 All returns are converted to US-dollar returns.  
The second column of Table 1 presents the market capitalization of each country on 
January 11, 2002, the starting date of our research. At the time, the smallest market in our 
sample was Sri Lanka with a market cap of US$0.49 Billion and the largest market was South 
Korea with US$124 Billion.  The third column gives the number of stocks in each country used 
for our study. The fourth to sixth column presents the arithmetic mean, geometric mean, and 
standard deviation of daily stock returns for each country. We compute these statistics for each 
company first and then average them across stocks within a country. One can see that the 
average daily returns are mostly negative during the 1995-2001 sample period. This is not 
surprising, since most countries in our study have suffered through a series of financial crises. 
The daily return volatility ranges from 2.2% in Portugal to 6.2% in Russia. The seventh and 
eighth column presents the mean and standard deviation of daily turnover. Again, we compute 
these statistics first for each company and then average them across stocks within a country.  
We can see that the average turnover varies dramatically across countries, with a sluggish 
turnover of 0.06% for Columbia and an extremely heavy turnover of 3.2% in South Korea. 
There is also a large variation of turnover volatility across markets, ranging from 0.12% in 
Russia to 6.2% in South Korea.  
The ninth to eleventh column presents the mean, median, and standard deviation of first 
order autocorrelation in daily returns. For the mean and median, we compute them for each 
company first and then average them across stocks within a country. For the standard 
deviation, however, it is computed as the cross-sectional variation of autocorrelations. We can 
see from the ninth column that the mean autocorrelation of stocks tend to positive in most 
countries but it could be negative such as in Pakistan. From the variation of autocorrelations, 
we can see that even for counties like Russia, where the mean autocorrelation is negative (-
0.074), the large standard deviation (0.154) suggests that there are still a large number of 
stocks with positive autocorrelation. These results are similar in spirit to those found in Harvey 
(1995a), who discovers positive first order autocorrelations for almost all emerging market 
                                                 
13 Because some stocks are subject to missing observations, the number of observations actually used in the 
study is less for these countries. Appendix Table 1b reports the average number of trading days for each country.  
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 indices but they vary greatly across markets. He further finds that the variation is partly 
explained by difference in market cap, trading volume, and asset concentration. However, he 
found there is much variation left to be explained.  Our objective here is to further explore 
return autocorrelation and turnover and to extract some useful information on speculative 
trading and corporate governance.    
  
3.2 Measuring Private Information Trading  
We start by estimating equation (2) for all emerging market stocks in our sample. For 
simplicity, we aggregate the parameter estimates by countries and the results are presented in 
Table 2, Panel A. Column 2 reports the cross-sectional averages of C  coefficients for each 
country in the sample. We can see that the average for most countries are positive, suggesting 
the presence of price momentum or the effects of non-synchronous trading.  These results are 
consistent with those of Harvey (1995a), who finds that emerging market indices generally 
exhibit short-term positive serial correlation.  
1
Column 3 reports the cross-sectional averages of C  coefficients for each country in 
the sample and Column 4 reports the percentage of positive C  coefficients. Average  
coefficient is positive for 10 out of 19 countries in the sample. Argentina, Brazil, Indonesia, 
Pakistan and Russia have the strongest evidence for informational trading. 50% or more of the 
stocks in Mexico, Pakistan, Peru, Portugal, Sri Lanka, Turkey, and Venezuela have shown 
positive C  coefficients. However, the percentage for Chile, Colombia, Greece, India, South 
Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, and Thailand is less than 50%. We find the strongest evidence of 
information trading in Brazil (C  > 0 for 72% of the stocks) and the least evidence in South 
Korea (  > 0 for 15.5% of the stocks). It is interesting that South Korea is generally 
perceived to have the most developed financial market among all the countries in our study and 
it also happens to show the least private information trading in the tests. 
2
2 2C
2
2C
2
It is worth noting that the total number of positive coefficients could be misleading 
because some of the positive coefficients might be not statistically significant. Thus, we also 
report the percentage of companies with significantly positive C coefficients (at 5% level) in 
column 5. The t-statistic is computed based on the White heteroscedasticity robust covariance 
matrix. The C  coefficient is statistically significant and positive for 140 stocks or 14% of our 
2
2
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 sample. It is interesting to note that Indonesia, one of the countries perceived to have the worst 
crony capitalism in the world, also happens to have the highest percentage, 42%, of 
significantly positive C coefficients.  Since C coefficient is determined by a balance between 
liquidity and information trading, it is remarkable that many Russian stocks still show a 
presence of information trading despite a low turnover. This implies that speculative trading 
must be quite extreme in order to dominate the effects of liquidity.   
2 2
We have also found that the sign of C  coefficient from regression (2) is robust to 
different specification of turnover measures. We consider log turnover detrended with a 20-, 
60-, or 120-day moving average. Column 7 of Table 2, Panel A reports the number of stocks 
whose  coefficient does not change sign under three different specifications of trading 
volume. Percentage of robust stocks varies between 71% (for Peru) and 93% (for India). 
Overall, Panel A results suggest the presence of private information trading in emerging 
markets, more pervasive in some countries than in others.  
2
2C
Next, we consider specifications for return and volume that are free of the market 
component. It is conceivable that the market component in return and turnover reflects overall 
market information while the idiosyncratic part corresponds to trades based on private 
information related to the company. Thus, we would expect more C coefficients to be positive 
in a modified regression (3). Panel B of Table 2 reports regression results. We find that the 
total number of positive C  coefficients has increased from 414 (Panel A) to 497 (Panel B). 
The increase in the number of positive C  coefficients is also noticed at the country level for 
16 out of 19 countries. Unfortunately, due to the increase in measurement errors, we have a 
drop in the percentage of companies with significantly positive C coefficients. The robustness 
check of C coefficients with respect to three different turnover measures indicates that results 
are quite robust to the alternative specifications of trading volume. Percentage of robust stocks 
varies between 66% (for Greece) and 90% (for Venezuela). Overall, the presence of 
speculative trades in emerging markets is supported when we decompose return and turnover 
2
2
2
2
2
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 into market and idiosyncratic components. 14   Our results suggest that there is noticeable 
information asymmetry in emerging market stocks.  
 
3.3 Speculative Trading and Corporate Governance 
In this section, we will examine relationship between private information trading and our 
broadly defined corporate governance measures. Our intuition is that informational asymmetry 
should be related to the quality of corporate governance and information disclosure. Therefore, 
intensity of private information trading could be a useful indicator for identifying corporate 
governance problems in emerging markets. For simplicity, we will classify various indicators 
of corporate governance into two broad categories, the rule of law and investor rights. Our first 
step is to relate the intensity of private information trading to the rule of law and information 
disclosure, which defines the macro-environment for corporate governance.  
Here we will briefly introduce our data source and the definition of the indicators. The 
variable used for the enforcement of insider trading laws is from Bhattacharya and Daouk 
(2002). It takes value of one for the corresponding country if the first prosecution under these 
laws has been conducted prior to or during the sample period of our study.15 The following 
indicators are obtained from the study of “Law and finance” by LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes, 
Shleifer, and Vishny (1998), which include the Efficiency of Judicial System, the Risk of 
Expropriation, and the Quality of Accounting Standards.16  We will pool all companies in our 
sample to run the following cross-sectional regression using the above indicators:  
 
,43210,2 iiiiii errorQASaRExpaEJSaITLEaaC +++++=       (4) 
                                                 
 
14 Equality of means test between C2 coefficients from regressions (2) and (3) has t-stat 3.34: significant at 5% 
level.  
15 See Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002) for the construction of the dummy variable. Notice that all countries in 
our sample had established insider trading law prior to the beginning of the sample period of our study but 
enforcement varies across countries.  
16 The efficiency index of the judicial system is the assessment of the legal system efficiency as it affects 
business, in particular, foreign companies. The index is produced by the country risk rating agency Business 
International Corp. The value is an average index from 1980 to 1983. The scale is from 0 to 10, where higher 
score indicates higher efficiency levels. The risk of expropriation is the assessment by the International Country 
Risk guide of the “outright confiscation” risk. The value is an average value of April and October monthly index 
averaged then from 1982 to 1995. The scale is from 0 to 10, with higher scores representing lower risks16. The 
index of the accounting standards is created by examining and rating the 1990 annual reports on their inclusion 
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where is Insider Trading Law Enforcement Index, EJS is Efficiency of Judicial System, 
is the Risk of Expropriation, QAS  - Quality of Accounting Standards for country i  The 
results of cross-sectional regression (4) are reported in Table 3, panel A. The dependent 
variable  for each company is obtained from regression (2). One can see that C  is 
inversely related to insider trading laws enforcement, the efficiency of the judicial system, the 
quality of the accounting standards, and positively related to the risk of expropriation. Thus, 
countries with no or little enforcement of their insider trading laws, inefficient judicial system, 
high risk of expropriation and low quality of the accounting standards are expected to have 
more private information trading.  Our results also remain unchanged if we regress C  
coefficients on each individual indictor.
iITLE
2C
i
iRE i .
2
2
17 
As a robustness check, we also conduct a cross-sectional regression analysis for C  
estimates obtained from the modified regression (3). Our results remain largely unchanged, 
especially for the single indicator regression. The only difference is that EJS  and  
become insignificant in the joint estimation. Note that the risk of expropriation index has the 
highest adjusted R-square value and t-statistics in the individual regressions.  
2
iQASi
Next, we explore relationship across countries between private information trading and 
the protection of the shareholder rights. We perform regression of C  coefficients on a set of 
indictors designed to capture the degree of investor rights protection and voting procedures 
across countries. In particular, we include the variables from Table 2 of LaPorta, Lopez-de-
Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998):
2
18 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
and omission of 90 items in seven categories (general information, income statements, funds flow statement, 
balance sheets, accounting standards, stock data, and special items). 
17 We have not included Corruption, Rule of Law, and Risk of Contract Repudiation variables in the regression 
specification due to their high correlation with the Insider Trading Law Enforcement and the Risk of 
Expropriation variables. 
18 Here we describe the variables briefly. The dummy variable labeled “One Share-One Vote” equals one if the 
company law or the commercial code of the country requires that the ordinary shares carry one vote per share. The 
“Oppressed Minority Mechanism” variable equals one if the company code or commercial code grants minority 
shareholders either a judicial venue to challenge the decisions of management or the assembly or the right to step 
out of the company by requiring that the company purchases their shares when they object to certain fundamental 
changes in capital or in the articles of incorporation. Minority shareholders are defined as those who own 10 
percent of share capital or less. The variable “Preemptive Rights to Issue” equals one if the company law or 
commercial code grants shareholders the first opportunity to buy new shares of stock, and this right can be waived 
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                 (5) 
 
where  stands for One share-One vote dummy variable, OMN   - oppressed minority 
mechanism dummy variable, PRI  - preemptive rights issue dummy variable, ESM  - 
percentage of share capital needed to call an extraordinary shareholder meeting regressor,  and 
 - concentrated ownership regressor for company i  One can see that the first five 
variables are clearly related to minority investor protection. The last two variables, SNB  -- 
shares not blocked before meeting dummy variable andCumVot  -- proportional representation 
of cumulative voting dummy variable, are procedural variables whose impact on investor 
protection is somewhat ambiguous.  
iOSOV i
i i
i
iCO .
i
Table 4 reports results for cross-sectional regression (5). Panel A uses C  estimates 
obtained from regression (2) for 978 stocks,
2
19 while Panel B uses C  estimates from regression 
(3).  Notice that all of the coefficients in the individual regressions are significant at the 5% 
level in Panel A of Table 4. The “one share-one vote” variable is inversely related to C . This 
implies that the presence of the one share-one vote rule is associated with a lower degree of 
private information trading. As expected, the “oppressed minority mechanism” variable is 
inversely related to C . The intuition is that the mechanism for protection of oppressed 
minority interest allows the latter to dispute the decisions of the management or the assembly. 
We also find that a higher percentage of share capital needed to call extraordinary 
2
2
2
                                                                                                                                                        
only by a shareholders’ vote. The variable “Percentage of Share Capital to Call an Extraordinary Shareholders’ 
Meeting” records the percentage of ownership of share capital that entitles a shareholder to call extraordinary 
shareholders’ meeting; it ranges from 1 to 33%. The “Concentrated Ownership” variable equals the mean 
ownership of the three largest investors in each of the 10 larges non-financial domestic firms. The “Shares Not 
Blocked Before Meeting” dummy variable equals one if the company law or the commercial code does not allow 
firms to require that shareholders deposit their shares prior to a general shareholders’ meeting and zero otherwise. 
The “Cumulative Voting/ Proportional Representation” dummy variable equals one if the company law or 
commercial code allows shareholders to cast all their votes for one candidate standing for election to the board of 
directors (cumulative voting) or if there is a mechanism of proportional representation in the board by which the 
minority shareholders may appoint a proportional number of directors to the board. The data for the latter is 
obtained from Table 7 in LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998). 
19 We exclude Russia from this part of the study because we are not aware of such macro-indicators for it. 
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 shareholders’ meeting is positively related to C . Moreover, higher degree of ownership 
concentration seems to give rise to more informational trading. However, our results on the 
“preemptive rights to issue” are ambiguous, since the results are not different in the single and 
joint estimation.   
2
,i
Next, we discover that the “shares not blocked before meeting” variable is positively 
related to C . One possible explanation here is that, if shares are not blocked before the 
shareholders’ meeting then they can be sold just before the meeting to take advantage of 
insider information. As a result, speculative trading could be high. The “cumulative voting/ 
proportional representation” dummy variable is positively related to C . Here, most estimates 
of  from the cross-sectional regression (5) do not change their sign irrespective of whether 
we run the regression individually or jointly. All indicators, except for the “preemptive rights 
to issue”, are statistically significant and preserve their signs in the individual regressions in 
Panel B, where we report regression results using C  estimates from regression (3). The only 
exception is the “preemptive rights to issue” variable, which becomes insignificant in Panel B.  
2
2
ia
2
Last, we analyze relationship between the average market capitalization of the 
companies in the sample and the intensity of private information trading. We estimate the 
following regression:  
 
)log(20
19
1
,2 i
j
jji errorMktCapDC ++=∑
=
αα      (6) 
 
where  is the country dummy and log( is the log of company’s average market 
capitalization in US dollars during the sample period. Here we use the country dummy 
variables to control for differences in the quality of corporate governance and information 
disclosure. Table 5 reports results of regression (6). In regression I, dependent variable is C  
coefficient from regression (2). In regression II, dependent variable is C  estimate from 
regression (3). We obtain statistically significant inverse relationship between log average 
market cap and the coefficients C  in both cases. Thus, the intensity of speculative trading is 
higher for small companies in emerging markets. Note that this finding is in line with the 
jD )iMktCap
2
2
2
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 original results of LMSW who find that small capitalization stocks exhibit more informational 
trading than large capitalization stocks.  
 
4. Special Case of the Russian Market  
 
In this section, we will explicitly link the extent of private information trading to corporate 
governance rankings. This section is based on the Russian data set, because we were able to 
obtain corporate governance rankings only for Russian companies. Russian market is of 
particular interest, because it is often considered one of the most opaque and hazardous 
markets in the world.  Until recently, its legal environment was so murky that Russia was not 
even rated by many international rating agencies. It is a market where undisclosed insider 
trading is a real possibility and where superior information of insiders and local investors could 
be incorporated in stock prices through their trades.  
 
4.1 Corporate events 
The theoretical model of LMSW suggests that price changes generated by informational trade 
tend to continue on high trading volume days. In light of this, we examine relationship between 
volume and return around major corporate events20. We will focus on the announcement and 
holding of corporate meetings. These are important corporate events in Russia, because 
corporate ownership structure, board structure, control rights, and asset disposition are 
determined in those meetings. In addition, we include press conferences, which typically 
involve news on corporate scandals.  We conjecture that private information trading tends to be 
most heavy when some important news is expected to arrive on the market. While news is not 
revealed yet to uninformed traders, insiders already know it. Hence, they may start trading 
before major news comes to the market. To detect such informational trade, we need to define 
event window during which we expect the trading volume to be high. We define it as 10 days 
prior to the announcement of the corporate meeting, plus the period between the announcement 
date and the effective date of the meeting, and 10 days after the effective date of the meeting. 
                                                 
20 We conjecture that corporate events periods are associated with high trading volume days. 
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 For each stock we create a corporate dummy variable D , which is one when the dates 
belongs to the event window of stock i, and zero otherwise. To capture additional information 
asymmetry during the event trading periods we estimate the following regression: 
c
ti,
 
.1,,,,3,,2,101, ++ ++++= tictititititititi DVRCVRCRCCR ε      (7) 
 
Here, shows what is the usual informational trading for stock i , and C shows the additional 
information asymmetry around corporate events days. We have obtained data about corporate 
announcements and their dates from Bloomberg. We report event dates in Appendix Table 1. 
The database includes corporate meetings, capital changes, as well as all the press conferences 
on company-related news. Press conferences in Russia are usually quite significant events 
because they are often related to some scandals that have a large impact on share prices. 
Intuitively, if insiders have some corporate information before it is made public, then we could 
expect more speculative trading around event dates.  
2C 3
Table 6 reports results for regression (7): estimated coefficients along with t-statistic for 
each stock, adjusted 2R , and the number of observations available for each stock. While many 
 coefficients are insignificant, we find the remainders are almost all positive. This supports 
our story of more informational trading around corporate meetings. For example, C  
coefficient for Russia’s largest company, Gasprom (Russian gas monopoly), is 0.443 around 
event periods. In general, our results support the hypothesis that major Russian “blue chips” 
show strong indications of speculative trading during event periods. Our results are consistent 
with several other papers investigating the relation between dynamics of return and trading 
volume using US data (see Stickel and Verrecchia (1994)). They find that when earnings 
announcements are accompanied by higher volume, returns tend to be positively correlated. 
Their results indicate that earnings announcements may generate a large amount of private 
information that lead to active speculative trading and return continuation
3C
3
21.  
                                                 
 
21 We have also looked how the nature of trades changes after the introduction of American Depositary Receipts 
(ADRs) on Russian stocks. The hypothesis is that the ADR introduction facilitates hiding of informational trades. 
Thus, the informational/allocational trading pattern should change as a result of international cross-listing. We did 
not find a structural break in the stocks’ trading patterns after ADR introduction. This result suggests the 
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4.2 Corporate Governance Issues 
Next, we study relation between the intensity of speculative trading and Russian corporate 
governance. We use corporate governance risk ranking for Russian companies computed by 
the investment bank Brunswick UBS Warburg.22 It ranks corporate governance of Russian 
companies on a scale from 0 to 60, with higher numbers indicating higher level of corporate 
governance risk. Following Black (2001a), we emphasize that corporate governance risk in 
emerging markets be interpreted as a risk stemming predominantly from the risk associated 
with information disclosure and the risk of self-dealing.23  Black’s (2001b) sample consists of 
20 companies, 15 of which are included in our sample24. Although we limit our cross-sectional 
analysis to only 15 companies, their stocks account for 89.6% of the Russian market 
capitalization. We consider the following regression specification: 
 
,10,2 iii errorRiskGovernanceaaC ++=         (8) 
 
We run OLS regression of specification (8) and correct errors for heteroskedasticity. The 
results are reported in Figure 1 and 2. The governance risk ranking is clearly positively related 
to the intensity of private information trading. The relationship is statistically significant. We 
obtain similar results using C  obtained regression (3). While we are aware that the sample is 2
                                                                                                                                                        
introduction of ADR did not greatly change the segmentation of market for Russian stocks. (see Domowitz, Glen, 
and Madhavan (1998) for a discussion on international cross-listing and segmentation of stock markets). 
22 There are several risk categories included in the corporate governance risk rating of Brunswick UBS Warburg 
for Russian companies. These are Disclosure and transparency risk (23%), Dilution through share issuance risk 
(17%), Asset stripping and transfer pricing (17%), Dilution through Mergers or restructuring (17%), Bankruptcy 
risk (8%), Limits on foreign ownership (8%), Management attitude towards shareholders (8%), Registrar risk 
(Registrar affiliated with the company) (2%). Notice that none of these components involves a firm’s market 
value. Corresponding weights are shown in brackets. 
23 The risk of self-dealing may include the risk of dilution through share issuance, the risk of asset stripping and 
transfer pricing, the risk of dilution through mergers or restructuring, and the risk of bankruptcy 
24  The companies included in our study are: Aeroflot, GAZ, Gazprom, Irkutskenergo, Lukoil, Mosenergo, 
Norilsk Nickel, Rostelecom, Sberbank, Severstal, Sibneft, Surgutneftegaz, Tatneft, Unified Energy Systems, and 
Yukos. The companies included in Black (2001b) sample are: Vimpelcom, Rostelecom, GAZ, Sun Interbrew, 
Mosenergo, Surgutneftegaz, Norilsk Nickel, Severstal, Aeroflot, Irkutskenergo, LukOil, United Energy Systems, 
Tatneft, Magnitogorsk, Sibneft, Sberbank, Gazprom, Yukos, Tomskneft, Samaraneftegaz, Yuganskneftegaz. The 
raw data is provided in the appendix.   
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 relatively small, our results nonetheless suggest a possible relationship between corporate 
governance and private information trading.  
 
5 Conclusion 
 
This paper measures the intensity of private information trading by examining the dynamic 
relation between return and volume of individual stocks in Russia and other emerging markets. 
In a simple model in which investors trade to share risk or speculate on private information, 
Llorente, Michaely, Saar, and Wang (2001) show that returns generated by risk-sharing trades 
tend to reverse themselves while returns generated by speculative trades tend to continue 
themselves. We apply this theoretical framework to measure the intensity of private 
information trading for individual stocks traded in emerging markets. We have also related 
measures of speculative trading to country legal environment and corporate governance.  One 
of the main advantages of our study is that it relies on trading data rather than accounting data. 
As a result, our data enjoys a high degree of transparency and uniformity across different 
markets, which makes it easier for cross-country comparison.    
Our empirical study finds strong evidence of speculative trading in emerging markets. 
Using corporate announcement data from Russia, we discover that the speculative trading is 
especially strong around major corporate event dates. We also find speculative trading in the 
most capitalized Russian stocks is related to poor corporate governance. Stocks in countries 
that enforce insider trading law and provide better investor protection exhibit less return 
continuation following high volume days.  Moreover, intense private information trading also 
reflects high degree of expropriation risk and poor minority shareholder protection. Thus, the 
intensity of speculative trading can be used as a possible measure of “information asymmetry” 
for ranking emerging market stocks.   
We examine the robustness of our results along several dimensions. First, we 
decompose both the volume and return series into systematic and idiosyncratic components. 
We find that information asymmetry remains when we remove the market-wide variations 
from the analysis. Second, we show that our findings are not sensitive to alternative definitions 
of trading volume.  We have also made a methodological contribution to the private 
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 information literature by combining the traditional event study approach with LMSW 
regressions. In the past, studies of private information (insider) trading used cumulative 
abnormal returns around event windows to measure the impact of private information on stock 
returns (see, for example, Bhattacharya, Daouk, Jorgenson, and Kehr (2000) and Banerjee and 
Eckard (2001)). The intuition behind our approach is that insiders and others with material 
information related to corporate event would exploit their information advantage by trading 
against uninformed outsiders. Thus, conditional on corporate event and high trading volume, 
we are more likely to observe return continuation when there is information asymmetry. 
However, there are several possible caveats for our measure of information asymmetry. 
First, since this measure is based on historical data, it is by nature an ex post measure of 
“information asymmetry” against uninformed investors. There is no guarantee that this 
“information asymmetry” will persist in the future. This is especially the case if investors may 
use it to avoid stocks that have a high degree of “information asymmetry”. This may cause 
corporate insiders to change their behavior in order to attract liquidity traders or uninformed 
investors. Second, private information trading may happen infrequently and vary in its 
intensity and trading frequency.25 As a result, it might be difficult for an econometrician to 
detect the speculative trading. Moreover, while we provide some measure for the intensity of 
“information asymmetry” and its relationship to poor corporate governance, it is not a direct 
measure of financial loss likely to be incurred by uninformed investors.  
With these limitations in mind, the approach developed in paper could be useful for 
emerging market researchers and investors. Recent investor experience in the U.S. with Enron 
and WorldCom highlights the importance of corporate governance. While the measures 
developed in the paper are certainly quite crude instruments for the job, they provide some 
independent information on the status of corporate governance of emerging market companies. 
A bi-product of our information measure is that it may sometimes serve as a liquidity proxy 
when C  is negative. Pastor and Stambaugh (2002) demonstrated that aggregated C  could be 
used as a proxy for the liquidity factor in the U.S. market. It world be interesting to see whether 
similar results can be obtained in emerging markets as well.  
2 2
                                                 
25 For example, if insider trading is conducted within a few hours or over a few weeks rather than over several 
days, then it would be hard for an econometrician to detect using only daily return and turnover data.  
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 There are many issues that remain to be examined. First, as a measure of “information 
asymmetry” (and indirectly for corporate governance as well) for emerging market stocks, we 
like to know whether this measure is persistent. Given the fact that insiders face little risk of 
prosecution in many emerging markets, we conjecture that they may continue to exploit their 
information advantage by trading against uninformed investors. Thus, return continuation upon 
high trading volume will persist and will be reflected in our measure. As a result, we 
conjecture that C  could provide an ex post as well as ex ante measure of information 
asymmetry against minority shareholders. However, we need to confirm this intuition with 
more empirical work. Second, it is interesting to know how our measure of “information 
asymmetry” is related to the cost of capital. Presumably, uninformed investors may stay away 
from stocks in which others have a distinct information advantage. This may increase cost of 
capital as discovered in the case of insider trading by Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002). Third, if 
there exists information asymmetry and poor corporate governance in emerging market stocks, 
how this would affect investment strategies of uninformed (or poorly informed) global 
investors is certainly an important issue. We leave these issues for further study in the future.  
2
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 Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for Emerging Markets 
The start date for the sample of emerging markets is December 30, 1994. The end date is November 1, 2001. Presented country market 
capitalization as of January 11, 2002 based on the sample. For Argentina we have excluded foreign companies because no data is reported 
on them in Datastream files. 
Daily Mean 
Daily Std. 
Dev. 
 
Turnover 
 
Autocorrelation Country 
Mkt Cap 
(BN 
$US) 
Stocks 
Arithmetic 
% 
Geometric 
% % 
Mean 
% 
Std. Dev 
% 
Mean 
ρ1,cs 
Median 
ρ1,cs 
Std. Dev. 
ρ1,cs 
 
Average 
Obs 
Argentina            13.97 20 -0.07 -0.12 3.09 0.11 0.13 0.050 0.037 0.064 1604
Brazil          
         
            
           
         
            
           
           
           
        
            
            
         
            
           
            
69.86 50 0.02 -0.04 3.75 0.68 2.07 0.050 0.066 0.062 669
Chile 30.10 40 0.00 -0.02 2.06 0.27 0.94 0.116 0.116 0.064 1421
Colombia 2.61 16 -0.06 -0.11 3.30 0.06 0.28 0.028 0.030 0.114 902
Greece 60.42 50 0.05 0.00 2.92 0.72 2.32 0.164 0.152 0.102 1187
India 44.81 30 0.01 -0.03 2.85 1.68 2.91 0.070 0.062 0.039 1596
Indonesia 17.59 49 -0.02 -0.13 4.84 0.42 1.10 -0.023 -0.005 0.128 1105
South Korea 124.54 200 -0.05 -0.14 4.26 3.19 6.17 0.059 0.058 0.044 1640 
Malaysia 71.01 102 -0.04 -0.10 3.32 0.18 0.37 -0.003 -0.014
 
0.077 1534
Mexico 106.66 89 0.00 -0.03 2.74 0.31 1.16 0.050 0.056 0.081 1082
Pakistan 5.24 85 -0.06 -0.11 3.35 0.93 1.76 -0.038 -0.019 0.089 968
Peru 3.25 35 -0.04 -0.08 3.88 0.61 1.47 0.001 0.008 0.097 852
Philippines 10.55 33 -0.10 -0.16 3.48 0.18 0.35 0.038 0.046 0.056 1557
Portugal 45.49 29 -0.04 -0.07 2.19 0.78 1.60 0.065 0.078 0.080 1209
Russia 49.43 28 0.27 0.07 6.22 0.07 0.12 -0.074 -0.048 0.154 867
Sri Lanka 0.49 25 -0.04 -0.08 2.81 0.12 0.90 -0.017 -0.009 0.076 963 
Thailand 19.43 50 -0.10 -0.18 4.07 0.46 0.80 0.033 0.043 0.058 1605
Turkey 25.99 50 0.15 0.06 4.42 2.41 4.62 0.012 0.016 0.042 1352
Venezuela 3.27 20 -0.05 -0.11 3.65 0.25 1.01 0.030 0.000 0.046 1175
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 Table 2. Dynamic Volume-Return Relationship, Emerging Markets sample 
 
Panel A: The table records the results of the regression analysis for the model 
 
1,,,,2,101, ++ +++= tititiititi VRCRCCR ε , 
 
where i indexes the companies in the corresponding country from our sample.  is the continuously compounded daily return, 
and  denotes the company turnover. The fraction of positive  coefficients (column four) and the fraction of 5%-level-
significant  coefficients (column five) are reported in percentage points. “Stocks robust to MA specification”(column seven) 
reports the number of stocks whose C coefficients do not change sign under alternative specifications for turnover (in 
particular when we detrend the turnover measure by a 60-day and 120-day moving average.) 
tiR ,
tiV , 2C
2C
2
 
Country Total number of stocks Mean C1 Mean C2 
% C2 > 0 
out of total 
%  t(C2) > 1.95 
out of total 
Mean adj. 
R2 
Stocks robust 
to MA 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Argentina 20 0.050 0.021 60.00 25.00 0.009 17
Brazil        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
50 0.020 0.029 72.00 20.00 0.007 37
Chile 40 0.134 -0.014 42.50 7.50 0.022 32
Colombia 16 0.073 -0.056 37.50 0.00 0.046 12
Greece 50 0.176 -0.043 28.00 2.00 0.032 38
India 30 0.090 -0.038 23.33 3.33 0.009 28
Indonesia 50 -0.038 0.023 60.00 42.00 0.029 38
South Korea 200 0.077 -0.048 15.50 3.00 0.009 177 
Malaysia 102 0.016 -0.030 30.39 7.84 0.011 91
Mexico 82 0.051 0.002 50.00 19.51 0.019 68
Pakistan 83 -0.072 0.023 55.42 18.07 0.032 67
Peru 35 0.012 0.007 54.29 17.14 0.042 25
Philippines 33 0.039 -0.007 42.42 18.18 0.007 27
Portugal 29 0.064 0.005 62.07 20.69 0.014 26
Russia 28 -0.098 0.018 57.14 25.00 0.053 25
Sri Lanka 25 -0.054 0.008 56.00 24.00 0.015 21 
Thailand 50 0.042 -0.006 46.00 12.00 0.007 38
Turkey 50 0.012 0.002 50.00 12.00 0.002 37
Venezuela 20 0.008 0.013 65.00 25.00 0.024 17
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 Panel B: The table records the results of the regression analysis for the model 
 
,1,,,2,101, ++ +++= tietietietieti VRCRCCR ε  
 
where i indexes the companies in the corresponding country in the sample.  is the continuously compounded daily excess 
return (excess over the market return), and  denotes the excess company turnover (excess over a measure of the market 
turnover). The fraction of positive  coefficients (column four) and the fraction of 5%-level-significant  coefficients 
(column five) are reported in percentage points. “Stocks robust to MA specification” (column seven) indicates the number of 
stocks whose C  coefficients do not change sign under alternative specifications of turnover (in particular when we detrend the 
turnover measure by a 60-day and 120-day moving average.) 
e
tiR ,
e
tiV ,
2C 2C
2
 
Country Total number of stocks Mean C1 Mean C2 
% C2  > 0 
out of total 
%  t(C2) > 1.95 out 
of total Mean adj. R
2 Stocks robust
to MA 
 (1)       
        
(2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Argentina 20 0.003 0.040 75.00 20.00 0.009 17
Brazil        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
       
        
        
        
        
        
        
50 -0.116 0.020 70.00 14.00 0.007 30
Chile 40 0.061 -0.004 45.00 7.50 0.009 34
Colombia 16 0.009 -0.043 50.00 6.25 0.041 14
Greece 50 0.162 -0.005 48.00 8.00 0.033 33
India 30 0.058 -0.018 26.67 0.00 0.005 26
Indonesia 50 -0.177 0.009 62.00 14.00 0.042 42
South Korea 200 0.039 -0.024 28.50 1.50 0.006 151
Malaysia 102 -0.042 -0.005 50.98 0.98 0.009 83
Mexico 86 0.017 0.001 53.49 6.98 0.016 67
Pakistan 84 -0.092 0.005 58.33 7.14 0.032 58
Peru 35 -0.004 -0.004 40.00 5.71 0.042 29
Philippines 33 -0.029 0.012 69.70 9.09 0.005 25
Portugal 29 0.050 0.016 68.97 6.90 0.009 23
Russia 28 -0.264 0.033 60.71 32.14 0.099 24
Sri Lanka 25 -0.107 0.007 48.00 4.00 0.022 19 
Thailand 50 -0.020 -0.002 52.00 6.00 0.007 38
Turkey 50 -0.001 -0.002 54.00 4.00 0.003 35
Venezuela 20 -0.040 0.030 75.00 20.00 0.019 18
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   Table 3. Rule of Law and Private Information Trading, Emerging Markets Sample 
 
Panel A:  Private information trading (based on the LMSW model coefficients) 
 
,43210,2 iiiiii errorQASaRExpaEFJSaITLEaaC +++++=   
     
where i indexes the corresponding company in the sample. The table records the cross-
sectional regressions of  coefficients from the LMSW model on four indices: the existence 
and enforcement of insider trading laws (value one if at least one prosecution based on these 
laws has been carried out), the efficiency of the judicial system, the risk of expropriation, and 
the quality of the accounting standards. The reported t-statistics are based on the White 
heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors. The coefficients C  used in Panel A are those 
obtained from the LMSW regression specification as in Table 2, Panel A. T-statistics for 
regression coefficients is reported in parenthesis below the coefficients. The regressions are 
performed using the entire sample of company data from 09/01/1995 to 11/01/2001. The 
values of the above indices are obtained from Table V from LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes, 
Shleifer, and Vishny (1998), except for the insider trading laws enforcement index, which is 
obtained from Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002).  
2C
2
 
 Independent Variables   
Dependent 
Variables 
Intercept Insider Trading 
Law Enforcement
Efficiency of 
Judicial System
Risk of 
Expropriation
Quality of Accounting 
Standards 
Adj. R2 
2C  0.116** -0.010* -0.003** 0.009** -0.001** 0.060 
 (5.345) (-1.762) (-2.026) (3.431) (-2.869)  
2C  0.005 -0.024**    0.022 
 (0.989) (-4.247)     
2C  0.035**  -0.008**   0.034 
 (4.603)  (-6.524)    
2C  0.110**   0.017**  0.055 
 (5.611)   (6.459)   
2C  0.049**    -0.001** 0.035 
 (3.589)    (-5.091)  
 
Note. ** - significant at 5 %, * - significant at 10 % 
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 Panel B: Panel B records the cross-sectional regressions of the C  coefficients from the 
LMSW model on the same four indices. The coefficients C  used in Panel B are those 
obtained from the LMSW regression specification in Table 2, Panel B (i.e. with a correction 
for market component). T-statistics for regression coefficients is reported in parenthesis below 
the coefficients. The regressions are performed using the entire sample of company data from 
09/01/1995 to 11/01/2001. The values of the above indices are obtained from Table V from 
LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998), except for the insider trading laws 
enforcement index, which is obtained from Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002). We have not 
included Corruption, Rule of Law, and Risk of Contract Repudiation variables in the 
regression specification due to their high correlation with the Insider Trading Law 
Enforcement and the Risk of Expropriation variables.  
2
2
 
  Independent Variables   
Dependent 
Variables 
Intercept Insider Trading 
Law Enforcement
Efficiency of 
Judicial System
Risk of 
Expropriation
Quality of Accounting 
Standards 
Adj. R2 
2C  0.100** -0.012** 0.000 0.015** 0.000 0.058 
 (5.481) (-2.567) (0.012) (6.637) (0.974)   
2C  0.011** -0.026**     0.034 
 (2.559) (-5.516)       
2C  0.004**   -0.002**    0.002 
 (0.748)   (-2.215)      
2C  0.116**    0.017**  0.070 
 (7.012)    (7.695)    
2C  0.007**      0.000* 0.002 
 (0.642)       (-1.704)   
 
Note. ** - significant at 5 %, * - significant at 10 % 
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 Table 4. Investor Rights and Private Information Trading, Emerging Markets Sample 
Panel A: The table records the results of the regression analysis for the model 
,76543210,2 iiiiiiiii errorCumVotaSNBaCOaESMaPRIaOMNaOSOVaaC ++++++++=                   
where i indexes the corresponding company in the sample (we have pooled together all companies across countries.) The dependent 
variable is the C coefficient in Table 2, Panel A. The values for the independent variables are obtained from tables two and seven 
in LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998). Reported t-statistics (in parentheses) are based on the White 
heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors. 
 
2
Independent Variables  
  
 
Intercept One Share-One Vote 
Oppressed
Minority 
Preemptive 
Rights to Issue
Percentage of Shares 
to Call an Extraordinary 
Shareholder Meeting 
Concentrated
Ownership 
Shares Not 
Blocked Before 
Meeting 
Cumulative Voting/
Proportional 
Representation 
Adj. R2 
2C  -0.064**         -0.003 0.006 -0.011** 0.069** 0.068** 0.021** 0.008 0.062
 (-4.958) (-0.495) (0.958) (-1.982) (2.070) (2.956) (3.571) (1.416)  
2C  -0.001 
  
    
     
     
           
   
-0.012**           0.009 
 (-0.446) (-3.284)             
2C  -0.027** -0.008**        0.003  
 (-8.557)  (-2.143)          
2C  -0.014** 0.017**       0.018  
 (-6.207)    (4.372)         
2C  -0.003 0.096**     0.016  
 (-1.210)     (4.618)       
2C  -0.017**       0.088** 0.034
 (-6.326)        (5.894)    
2C  -0.019** 0.029** 0.052
 (-5.889)       (7.419)    
2C  -0.054**         0.019** 0.019
 (-7.273)           (4.158)  
Note. ** - significant at 5 %, * - significant at 10 % 
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Panel B: The table records the results of the regression analysis for the model in Panel A, where the dependent variable is 
C coefficients from Table 2, Panel B (i.e. a correction for market component.) The values for the independent variables are 
obtained from Table 2 in LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998). Reported t-statistics (in parentheses) are based 
on White heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors. 
2
 
   Independent Variables
  
 
Intercept One Share-One Vote 
Oppressed
Minority 
Preemptive 
Rights to Issue
Percentage of Shares 
to Call an Extraordinary 
Shareholder Meeting 
Concentrated
Ownership 
Shares Not 
Blocked Before 
Meeting 
Cumulative Voting/
Proportional 
Representation 
Adj. R2 
2C  -0.097**          0.006 0.017** -0.005 0.096** 0.113** 0.015** 0.012** 0.097
 (-7.720)        
 
  
    
         
         
          
(1.037) (3.186) (-0.939) (3.428) (5.047) (3.317) (2.642)   
2C  0.000 -0.021**           0.021  
 (-0.056) (-4.798)             
2C  -0.032** -0.014**        0.009  
 (-9.762)  (-3.199)          
2C  -0.017**    0.004      0.000  
 (-6.897)    (0.905)        
2C  -0.004      0.082**     0.010  
 (-1.084)      (3.594)       
2C  -0.014**       0.102** 0.058
 (-5.127)        (7.780)    
2C  -0.021** 0.031** 0.044
 (-6.254) (7.057)
2C  -0.056** 0.015** 0.009
 (-8.679)           (2.897)  
Note. ** - significant at 5 %, * - significant at 10 % 
 
 
 
33 
 Table 5. The relationship between coefficients C and stock market capitalization, 
Emerging Markets Sample 
2
 
The table records the regression of the C  coefficient on country dummies and the average 
company capitalization in logs of US$ values.  
2
,)log(20
19
1
,2 ii
j
jji errorMktCapDC ++= ∑
=
αα   
where i indexes the corresponding company in the sample. Reported t-statistics are based on 
the White heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors. Regression I reports results where 
dependent variable is the coefficient  obtained from the regression specification in Table 2, 
Panel A. Regression II reports results for dependent variable the coefficient C  obtained from 
the regression specification in Table 2, Panel B. The value of the dummy variable D
2C
2
i is 1 
when the corresponding company is included in the country i stock market index, and zero 
otherwise. D1 is the dummy variable for Argentina, D2 for Brazil, D3 for Chile, D4 for 
Columbia, D5 for Greece, D6 for India, D7 for Indonesia, D8 for South Korea, D9 for Malaysia, 
D10 for Mexico, D11 for Pakistan, D12 for Peru, D13 for Philippines, D14 for Portugal, D15 for 
Russia, D16 for Sri Lanka, D17 for Thailand, D18 for Turkey, and D19 for Venezuela. 
 
 Regression I Regression II 
 Coefficient T-Stat Coefficient T-Stat 
Stock Market 
Capitalization -0.01** (-2.51) -0.01** (-2.40)
D1 0.14** (2.84) 0.15** (2.88) 
D2 0.16** (3.04) 0.16** (3.00) 
D3 0.11** (2.22) 0.11** (2.22) 
D4 0.04 (0.69) 0.10* (1.68) 
D5 0.08 (1.45) 0.11* (1.94) 
D6 0.09* (1.72) 0.09 (1.59) 
D7 0.14** (2.96) 0.11** (2.11) 
D8 0.07* (1.46) 0.07 (1.44) 
D9 0.09* (1.88) 0.13** (2.42) 
D10 0.12** (2.53) 0.13** (2.51) 
D11 0.13** (2.93) 0.14** (2.88) 
D12 0.11** (2.47) 0.10** (2.25) 
D13 0.11** (2.35) 0.14** (2.57) 
D14 0.13** (2.56) 0.12** (2.18) 
D15 0.14** (2.79) 0.18** (3.02) 
D16 0.11** (2.74) 0.11** (2.42) 
D17 0.11** (2.36) 0.13** (2.48) 
D18 0.12** (2.57) 0.13** (2.48) 
D19 0.12** (2.66) 0.13** (2.65) 
     
Adj. R2 0.163  0.170  
Note. ** - significant at 5 %, * - significant at 10 % 
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 Table 6: Conditioning on corporate events in the RTS sample 
 
The table records the results of the regression analysis for the following model: 
 
,1,,,,3,,2,101, ++ ++++= tictititititititi DVRCVRCRCCR ε  
where i indexes the corresponding company in the sample. D  is a dummy variable with value 1 
for the event period around the corporate events described in Appendix table one, and 0 otherwise. 
The dummy variable takes value 1 in the event window, which we define to be 10 days prior the 
announcement date, time between the announcement and effective date of the corporate event, and 
10 days after the corporate event. R  is the continuously compounded daily return, and V  
denotes the daily stock turnover. 
c
ti,
ti, ti,
 
Company C0 C1 C2 C3 
t-stat for 
(C0) 
t-stat for 
(C1) 
t-stat for 
(C2) 
t-stat for 
(C3) 
Adj. R2
Aeroflot -0.001 -0.137 -0.095 0.184 -0.25 -3.48 -2.74** 2.56** 0.024 
Cerepovetz Severstal 0.004 -0.291 -0.057 0.064 0.72 -6.16 -1.10 0.09 0.080 
GAZ 0.000 -0.035 -0.064 -0.173 0.04 -0.85 -1.83* -1.47 0.010 
Gazprom -0.001 0.156 -0.234 0.443 -0.70 5.09 -4.07** 6.70** 0.064 
Irkutskenergo 0.001 -0.013 -0.077 0.060 0.49 -0.45 -2.40** 0.59 0.003 
Kamaz -0.005 -0.142 0.039 0.137 -0.76 -2.88 0.70 1.47 0.016 
Lenenergo 0.002 -0.215 0.098 -0.235 0.41 -4.90 2.28** -2.23** 0.061 
Lukoil com 0.000 -0.016 0.066 0.013 0.32 -0.56 1.85* 0.11 0.001 
Lukoil pfd -0.001 -0.079 0.189 -0.113 -0.47 -2.61 6.97** -1.46 0.049 
MGTS -0.001 -0.010 -0.012 0.149 -0.09 -0.19 -0.24 1.80* 0.003 
Mosenergo 0.000 0.062 -0.050 -0.023 0.22 2.30 -1.99** -0.23 0.003 
Norilsk Nickel com 0.000 -0.362 0.066 0.027 0.15 -13.68 2.47** 0.19 0.130 
Norilsk Nickel pfd 0.000 -0.252 0.145 0.120 -0.02 -4.84 2.95** 0.58 0.032 
PTS 0.005 -0.257 -0.137 0.090 0.68 -5.42 -5.00** 1.08 0.162 
Purneftegaz 0.001 -0.495 0.169 -0.313 0.10 -12.45 3.34** -1.31 0.281 
Rostelecom com 0.000 0.084 -0.111 0.150 0.05 2.91 -3.45** 2.25** 0.009 
Rostelecom pfd -0.004 -0.063 0.064 0.134 -1.61 -1.84 1.92* 3.05** 0.069 
Sahalinmorneftegaz 0.003 -0.287 0.027 -0.066 0.24 -4.92 0.39 -0.10 0.077 
Sberbank of Russia -0.002 -0.118 0.051 0.241 -0.90 -3.58 2.14** 2.12** 0.021 
Sibneft -0.002 -0.379 0.003 0.209 -0.42 -6.97 0.05 1.58 0.134 
Slavneft 0.000 -0.343 0.003 0.529 0.00 -8.61 0.09 6.06** 0.144 
Surgutneftegaz com 0.002 0.091 -0.038 0.001 1.12 3.15 -1.12 0.01 0.005 
Surgutneftegaz pfd 0.002 -0.269 -0.092 0.259 0.81 -6.82 -1.95** 2.15** 0.107 
Tatneft 0.000 -0.084 0.019 0.172 -0.06 -2.76 0.60 1.75* 0.006 
UES com 0.001 0.041 -0.075 0.060 0.82 1.55 -1.87** 0.44 0.001 
UES pfd 0.001 0.018 -0.065 -0.040 0.36 0.54 -2.21** -0.54 0.005 
Uralsviazinform -0.007 -0.306 0.001 0.032 -1.06 -5.73 0.02 0.33 0.084 
Yukos 0.000 -0.112 -0.002 0.002 0.04 -1.44 -0.03 0.03 0.007 
Average 0.000 -0.136 -0.006 0.075     0.057 
% positive coefficients   50% 75%      
% t-stat  > 1.95       21.43% 25%  
% t-stat  > 1.64       28.57% 32.14%  
Note.** - significant at 5 %, * - significant at 10 % 
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Figure 1: Plain Vanilla C2 Coefficient Versus the Corporate Governance Ranking 
-0.1
0.0
0.1
0.2
0 10 20 30 40
Governance Ranking
(high ranking implies worse governance)
C
2 
C
oe
ffi
ci
en
t
 
 
  %5.21,004.0087.0 2
)502.3()474.2(,2
=+×+−=
−
RRiskGovernanceC iii ε
 
Figure 2: C2 Coefficient Versus the Corporate Governance Ranking (Removed Market 
Component)  
 
-0.1
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0 10 20 30 40
Governance Ranking
(higher ranking implies worse governance)
C
2 
C
oe
ffi
ci
en
t
(R
em
ov
ed
 M
ac
ro
 C
om
po
ne
nt
)
 
  %9.10,004.0056.0 2
)144.2()241.1(,2
=+×+−=
−
RRiskGovernanceC iii ε
 
 
36 
Note. t-statistics are reported in brackets and are based on the White heteroscedasticity robust 
covariance matrix. 
 Appendix.  
 
Table 1. Corporate Events, RTS sample 
Company Corporate Event Date Corporate Meetings and Press Conferences 
Aeroflot 
 
Announcement 3/17/99, 4/16/99, 3/13/00, 3/16/00, 2/15/01, 3/4/01, 3/30/01, 8/17/01
  
Effective 3/17/99, 4/23/99, 5/12/99, 6/26/99, 3/15/00, 6/24/00, 3/30/01, 
4/9/01, 5/19/01, 9/6/01 
Gaz  Announcement 3/17/99, 2/14/00, 11/28/00, 11/29/00, 3/30/01 
  Effective 4/24/99, 4/29/00, 11/29/00, 1/20/01, 6/23/01 
Gazprom Announcement 2/17/99, 7/14/99, 7/22/99, 8/24/99, 3/7/00, 8/28/00, 10/23/00, 
12/4/00, 1/01/01, 2/08/01, 4/16/01, 5/21/01, 7/12/01, 10/10/01 
  
Effective 6/30/99, 7/20/99, 7/26/99, 8/26/99, 6/30/00, 9/1/00, 10/26/00, 
11/3/00, 12/9/00, 1/23/01, 2/14/01, 5/30/01, 6/29/01, 7/23/01, 
10/16/01 
Irkutskenergo Announcement 3/25/99, 1/20/00, 3/20/00, 3/27/00, 5/03/00, 5/10/00, 3/28/01 
  Effective 4/7/99, 3/28/00, 3/31/00, 4/28/00, 5/5/00, 6/30/00, 4/28/01 
Kamaz Announcement 5/31/99, 8/24/99, 10/18/99, 3/27/00, 6/3/00, 5/17/01 
  Effective 6/30/99, 9/24/99, 10/20/99, 4/25/00, 6/29/00, 6/27/01 
Lenenrgo Announcement 2/12/99, 10/12/99, 3/20/00, 2/22/01 
  Effective 5/20/99, 12/8/99, 5/25/00, 5/24/01 
Lukoil Announcement 3/15/99, 5/12/99, 3/31/00, 4/6/01 
  Effective 4/9/99, 6/29/99, 6/8/00, 6/28/01 
MGTS Announcement 4/6/99, 4/12/00, 4/13/01 
  Effective 6/26/99, 6/17/00, 5/14/01, 6/16/01 
Mosenergo Announcement 3/6/99, 3/20/00, 12/28/00 
  Effective 4/26/99, 5/15/00, 5/18/01 
Norilsk Nickel Announcement 5/18/99, 4/11/00, 8/19/00. 10/16/00, 2/13/01, 4/28/01 
  Effective 6/18/99, 6/23/00, 8/22/00, 11/24/00, 2/13/01, 5/21/01 
PTS Announcement 4/14/99, 2/16/00, 4/26/00, 4/17/01, 10/08/01 
  Effective 5/27/99, 4/3/00, 6/9/00, 5/25/01, 11/28/01 
Purneftegaz Announcement 3/31/99, 2/28/00, 10/11/00, 5/4/01, 7/6/01 
  Effective 4/23/99, 4/20/00, 10/23/00, 5/25/01, 7/31/01 
Rostelecom Announcement 6/1/95, 5/1/96, 6/1/97, 6/1/98, 4/2/99, 4/8/99, 5/3/00, 10/16/00, 
5/22/01 
  Effective 6/25/95, 6/17/96, 7/18/97, 6/27/98, 4/7/99, 6/26/99, 6/24/00, 
11/18/00, 6/30/01 
Sakhalin-
morneftegaz 
Announcement 3/23/99, 11/5/99, 4/25/00, 12/26/00, 3/30/01, 9/14/01 
  Effective 4/26/99, 11/24/99, 4/27/00, 12/26/00, 5/12/01, 10/2/01 
 
 
 
37 
  
38 
(Table 1 continued) 
 
Sberbank Announcement 6/7/99, 6/3/00, 5/18/01 
  Effective 6/30/99, 6/30/00, 6/27/01 
Severstal Announcement 3/17/99, 3/21/00, 5/29/01 
  Effective 4/30/99, 4/28/00, 6/29/01 
Sibneft Announcement 5/27/99, 5/17/00, 10/9/00, 10/11/00, 5/3/01, 7/6/01, 9/17/01, 
10/08/01, 10/30/01 
  
Effective 6/29/99, 5/17/00, 6/28/00, 10/10/00, 11/28/00, 6/29/01, 8/17/01, 
11/12/01, 12/01/01 
Slavneft Announcement 4/30/99, 2/28/00, 5/5/00, 3/5/01 
  Effective 10/3/98, 1/30/99, 6/29/99, 1/14/00, 6/30/00, 6/29/01 
Surgutneftegaz Announcement 3/17/99, 1/11/00, 3/23/00, 6/5/00, 3/5/01 
  Effective 5/22/99, 2/10/00, 5/6/00, 6/30/00, 5/6/01 
Tatneft Announcement 3/11/99, 2/29/00, 3/25/00, 7/24/00, 11/28/00, 3/30/01 
  Effective 6/25/99, 3/25/00, 6/23/00, 7/25/00, 11/28/00, 6/22/01 
Unified Energy 
System 
Announcement 6/19/98, 4/30/99, 10/20/99, 3/20/00, 3/31/00, 4/28/00, 5/12/00, 
7/27/00, 8/21/00, 11/16/00, 1/26/01, 3/1/01 
  
Effective 6/19/98, 6/25/99, 10/26/99, 4/4/00, 4/28/00, 5/12/00, 6/30/00, 
7/27/00, 8/30/00, 11/3/00, 11/16/00, 2/2/01, 4/28/01 
Uralsvyazinform Announcement 3/10/99, 4/5/99, 4/11/00, 7/24/01 
  Effective 4/6/99, 5/21/99, 5/26/00, 9/27/01 
Yukos* Announcement 2/18/99, 5/18/99, 10/18/99, 4/17/00, 4/19/00, 10/26/00, 4/19/01, 
10/4/01 
  Effective 2/20/99, 6/29/99, 10/23/99, 4/18/00, 6/3/00, 10/26/00, 6/20/01, 
10/18/01 
 
Note. The table lists the announced days and the effective days for corporate meetings listed in Bloomberg 
for the period 09/01/1995 – 11/01/2001. Notice that Bloomberg effectively started covering most of the 
listed companies above in 1997. However, for several companies, the coverage starts in 1995. Note that 
for some companies more effective dates might be available. 
*From 06/30/1999 to 05/16/2000 no deals are reported in RTS for the company Yukos. The latter was not 
admitted for trading at RTS for the above-mentioned period. 
 
 
